MediumRequest targets a private, loopback or cloud-metadata address
The workflow addresses "10.11.12.101:8006", which is only meaningful inside a private network and is a classic SSRF target.
Confidence: high · Definite match
Suggested fix: Confirm this internal target is intended and that the n8n instance's network access is restricted accordingly.
MediumRequest targets a private, loopback or cloud-metadata address
The workflow addresses "10.11.12.101:8006", which is only meaningful inside a private network and is a classic SSRF target.
Confidence: high · Definite match
Suggested fix: Confirm this internal target is intended and that the n8n instance's network access is restricted accordingly.
MediumRequest targets a private, loopback or cloud-metadata address
The workflow addresses "10.11.12.101:8006", which is only meaningful inside a private network and is a classic SSRF target.
Confidence: high · Definite match
Suggested fix: Confirm this internal target is intended and that the n8n instance's network access is restricted accordingly.
MediumRequest targets a private, loopback or cloud-metadata address
The workflow addresses "10.11.12.101:8006", which is only meaningful inside a private network and is a classic SSRF target.
Confidence: high · Definite match
Suggested fix: Confirm this internal target is intended and that the n8n instance's network access is restricted accordingly.
MediumRequest targets a private, loopback or cloud-metadata address
The workflow addresses "10.11.12.101:8006", which is only meaningful inside a private network and is a classic SSRF target.
Confidence: high · Definite match
Suggested fix: Confirm this internal target is intended and that the n8n instance's network access is restricted accordingly.
MediumRequest targets a private, loopback or cloud-metadata address
The workflow addresses "10.11.12.101:8006", which is only meaningful inside a private network and is a classic SSRF target.
Confidence: high · Definite match
Suggested fix: Confirm this internal target is intended and that the n8n instance's network access is restricted accordingly.
MediumRequest targets a private, loopback or cloud-metadata address
The workflow addresses "10.11.12.101:8006", which is only meaningful inside a private network and is a classic SSRF target.
Confidence: high · Definite match
Suggested fix: Confirm this internal target is intended and that the n8n instance's network access is restricted accordingly.
MediumAI agent with action-taking tools receives untrusted input
The agent can call Tool Http Request, Tool Http Request, Tool Http Request and its input can come from outside. Prompt injection could steer those tool calls.
Confidence: low · Heuristic
Suggested fix: Constrain tool parameters, require confirmation for irreversible actions, and keep secrets out of the agent's context.
LowUser-influenced URL path in HTTP request
The request host is fixed, but part of the path/query is built from data that can originate from a public entry point. Path injection is possible; full SSRF is not.
Confidence: medium · Heuristic · Via real connections
Suggested fix: Validate the target against an allow-list of hosts before the request, and block private/loopback/link-local ranges on the n8n host.
LowUser-influenced URL path in HTTP request
The request host is fixed, but part of the path/query is built from data that can originate from a public entry point. Path injection is possible; full SSRF is not.
Confidence: medium · Heuristic · Via real connections
Suggested fix: Validate the target against an allow-list of hosts before the request, and block private/loopback/link-local ranges on the n8n host.
LowUser-influenced URL path in HTTP request
The request host is fixed, but part of the path/query is built from data that can originate from a public entry point. Path injection is possible; full SSRF is not.
Confidence: medium · Heuristic · Via real connections
Suggested fix: Validate the target against an allow-list of hosts before the request, and block private/loopback/link-local ranges on the n8n host.
LowUser-influenced URL path in HTTP request
The request host is fixed, but part of the path/query is built from data that can originate from a public entry point. Path injection is possible; full SSRF is not.
Confidence: medium · Heuristic · Via real connections
Suggested fix: Validate the target against an allow-list of hosts before the request, and block private/loopback/link-local ranges on the n8n host.
LowUser-influenced URL path in HTTP request
The request host is fixed, but part of the path/query is built from data that can originate from a public entry point. Path injection is possible; full SSRF is not.
Confidence: medium · Heuristic · Via real connections
Suggested fix: Validate the target against an allow-list of hosts before the request, and block private/loopback/link-local ranges on the n8n host.
